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Abstract
This paper explores the role of regulation and legislation on influencing the development and diffusion of technologies and 
methods of crop production. To do this, the change in pesticide registration under European Regulation 1107/2009 ‘Plac-
ing Plant Protection Products on the Market’ was followed through the UK’s agricultural system of innovation. Fieldwork 
included: a series of interviews conducted with scientists, agronomists and industry organisations; a programme of visiting 
agricultural events; as well as sending an electronic survey to British potato growers. The innovation system is noted to 
have made the legislation less restrictive than originally proposed. The most notable system response to the legislation is the 
adjustment of agrochemical company pesticide discovery strategy and their expansion into biologically derived treatments. 
There have also been other innovation responses: agricultural seed companies have been breeding in pathogen resistance 
in their cultivars; agricultural consultancies are prepared to recommend pathogen-resistant seeds; scientists are using the 
change as justification for adopting their solutions; the agricultural levy boards funded research into off-label pesticide uses; 
and producers, potato growers in particular, have been seeking advice, but not changing their growing practices.
Keywords Systems of Innovation · Multi-sited ethnography · Legislation · Campaigning · Pesticides · Regulation 
1107/2009
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Introduction
That the twenty-first century needs another agricultural 
revolution is well established with calls for a Doubly Green 
revolution (Conway 2005), low-input agriculture (Vanlo-
queren and Baret 2008), and sustainable agriculture in gen-
eral (Pretty 2005). Some of the solutions lie in the diffusion 
of existing knowledge and technology and some lie in the 
development of new knowledge and technology. The Sys-
tems of Innovation (SI) literature (e.g. Borrás et al. 2011) 
gives us hope by suggesting that innovative solutions emerge 
through multiple channels, including policy, infrastructure, 
and market mechanisms (Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008). This 
systemic change can be intentional, such as through planned 
intervention, or unintentional, i.e. the unintended knock-on 
effects of an intervention.
This paper draws on Systems of Innovation approaches to 
understand how non-market factors can influence the knowl-
edge and technologies available to the actors and networks 
of UK agriculture. Specifically, this research focuses on the 
institutional set up of the system of innovation because they 
“… determine the innovative performance…of national 
firms” (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993, p. 4). But curiously, 
given this interest in the institutional environment, there are 
few studies focusing on a particular institutional change and 
its influence on the system (with the exception of van Mierlo 
et al. 2010).
Therefore, this paper is focused on an institutional inter-
vention into the UK’s system of agricultural innovation and 
documents an empirical example through the case of the 
European Commission’s (EC) Regulation 1107/2009 ‘Plac-
ing Plant Protection Products on the Market’ (Regulation 
1107/2009 herein). This paper will review Systems of Inno-
vation thinking and then will present background on the 
registration of pesticides under Regulation 1107/2009. The 
multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork will then be described, 
after which the opposing views in the science-policy inter-
face are presented and how these may have shaped the leg-
islation. The last part of this paper presents the ways the 
system has responded to the legislation by discussing inno-
vation and diffusion activities of the agrochemical industry, 
plant breeding, agronomists, and then will touch on how 
growers have responded.
Literature on innovation systems
The basic premise of Systems of Innovation (SI) scholar-
ship is that innovation is non-linear with multiple influences 
arising from entanglements of different parts of the system 
(Hall et al. 2003). SI scholars also cite theories of learning 
as significant (Johnson 2011; Lundvall 2007): as firms and 
individuals interact with science infrastructure or corporate 
reporting (as a way to interact with a regulatory framework), 
this has an influence on the firm, which, in part, causes the 
evolution of the system (Edquist and Hommen 1999). How-
ever, to describe it as a system, is not to say that it is sys-
tematically organised, but that it is systemic (Narula 2003); 
an influence on one part of the system has a ripple effect on 
other parts.
There is a body of sectoral innovation literature that 
focuses on agricultural innovation systems.1 This literature 
takes inspiration from the nuanced approach of systems 
of innovation, in that agricultural innovation is suggested 
to emerge from a process of multiple interactions (Engel 
1995) and involves multiple actors (Hall et al. 2003). This 
body of literature suggests a focus on better co-ordination 
to transform agriculture (e.g. Spielman et al. 2008) as it 
includes considerable publications on innovation interme-
diaries (e.g. Klerkx and Leeuwis 2008); the role of public 
sector extension services (Spielman et al. 2011; Klerkx et al. 
2006); communication between system actors (Morriss et al. 
2006); links with farmers (Rockenbauch et al. 2019; Isaac 
2012) and so on. These approaches understand agricultural 
innovation to involve multiple actors: “It is now recognised 
that agricultural innovations come from multiple sources: 
research staff; development agencies; farmers; NGOs; pri-
vate companies; entrepreneurs; and artisans” (Hall et al. 
2003, p. 220).
In terms of a UK agricultural innovation system, this 
includes research institutes (e.g. the John Innes Centre), pri-
vate sector companies (e.g. Syngenta), funding bodies (e.g. 
the Biosciences and Biotechnology Research Council), and 
government departments (e.g. the Department for Environ-
ment, Farming and Rural Affairs). Agricultural innovation 
systems include farmers themselves as users of products and 
as developers of new methods of production. These are the 
organisations one might try to align if trying to optimise an 
innovation system as seen in Gildemacher et al.’s (2009) 
study of Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia seeking increase 
potato production and improve farmer livelihoods.
1 Klerkx et al. (2012) identify two agricultural innovation literatures, 
the Agricultural Innovation Systems literature (e.g. Hall et al. 2003) 
which emerged out of the SI literatures (e.g. Edquist 1997) and the 
Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems (e.g. Engel 1995) 
which emerged as a critique of earlier Farming Systems Research 
which itself was a critique of earlier technology transfer theories. As 
they both emphasis the interrelated nature of the systems, they are 
treated interchangeably in this paper.
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However, the systemic approach to innovation systems (e.g. 
Narula 2003) casts its net wider and includes influences such 
as politics, lobbying, economic demand, the next generation of 
scientific expertise,2 through to the agroecological environment 
and socio-technical regimes (Kuhn 1970; Dosi 1982; Vanlo-
queren and Baret 2008). It is an inclusive theory. The author has 
described these organisations and influences in detail elsewhere 
Payne-Gifford (2011) and mapped this complexity (see Fig. 1).
Some of these organisations are linked through sales, 
contracts, incentives, personal relationships, employment, 
regulatory requirements and agroecological constraints.
That there is a link between regulation and innovation is 
established in the wider innovation literature, although there 
is variation according to the type of regulation and as to the 
extent and type of innovation:
…[T]he impacts of regulation have been assessed 
as rather ambivalent for innovation in general, often 
depending on the different types of innovation. Differ-
ent types of regulations generate various impacts on 
innovation, and even a single specific regulation can 
influence innovation in various ways (Blind 2012, p. 1).
Blind’s literature review on regulation and innovation 
identifies so-called ‘social’ regulation—that which seeks 
to correct negative externalities—as having a strong effect 
on innovation (as opposed to economic or institutional 
regulation). Although social regulation, e.g. tighter environ-
mental restrictions, might increase the cost of compliance in 
the short-term, it can increase long-term gains (Blind 2012).
Kesidou and Demirel’s study of the drivers of eco-inno-
vations supports this view; although individual actors may 
decry the introduction of a new regulation, for environmen-
tal economists “[r]egulation is not seen as an undesirable 
cost-increasing factor but as a stimulator of firms’ innova-
tiveness that, in turn, would lead to a first-mover advantage 
in markets for eco-innovations…” (Kesidou and Demirel 
2012, p. 863). Again there is variation in how firms respond 
to regulation, with less innovative companies adapting to 
regulations as a cost-saving measure and more innovative 
companies taking the new regulation as an opportunity to 
transform their business and gain access to new markets.
Particularly relevant to this paper, Ollinger and Fernan-
dez-Cornejo’s 1998 study on pesticide regulation by the 
USA’s Environmental Protection Agency found a decreased 
number of products brought to market, but the encourage-
ment of less toxic formulations. In focusing on a change in 
regulation and its influence of a system of innovation, the 
focus is not only on how firms respond; it is on how the sys-
tem responds. This includes pesticide development, but also 
includes possible changes in agronomic practice as well as 
a variety of public and private agricultural goods: chemical 
control, biological agents, disease-resistant seeds and so on.
Moreover, when it comes to the literature on Regulation 
1107/2009 none is focused on its potential to induce inno-
vation. Researchers mention Regulation 1107/2009 as the 
context making their research relevant (e.g. Peruzzi et al. 
2012) but these studies then go on to focus on technical mat-
ters rather than assessing whether their solution is likely to 
be widely adopted.
Fig. 1  Mapping the complexity 
of an agricultural innovation 
system (source author)
2 Although there is demand for biological control methods (using 
organisms and biologically derived treatments), there is a shortage of 
trained entomologists to support its expansion. A junior agronomist 
was met during fieldwork who had applied to an agricultural con-
sultancy for a clerical post but was taken on as a trainee agronomist 
because she had taken one undergraduate entomology module. The 
company chose to deploy that knowledge into their consultancy busi-
ness rather than hire her as a receptionist.
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Background on UK pesticide use, innovation 
and regulation
Like many countries, agricultural pesticide use in the UK 
increased in the post World War Two era with the use of 
organochlorides such as Dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane 
(DDT) and like the rest of world, Carson’s influential Silent 
Spring contributed to their phasing out (Davis 2014; Mat-
thews 2018). In addition to banning organochlorides, this 
period saw the tightening of pesticide regulation, although 
scholars point out that these regulations were co-developed 
with the agrochemical companies developing new active 
substances (Jas 2007; Tait 2001). After the organochlorides 
came a new generation of organophosphates which were less 
damaging for the environment but more hazardous for farm 
workers (Tait 2001). These were then followed by the intro-
duction of pyrethroid insecticides which were less toxic to 
farm operators but more toxic to aquatic life (Tait 2001) which 
were in turn restricted. The next generation of insecticides 
introduced in the 1990s, neonicotinoids, were shown to be 
non-lethal. However, the worldwide decline in pollinators led 
a new generation of scientists to investigate and demonstrate 
a sub-lethal effect on their foraging ability, one not tested for 
in the pesticide approvals process (Godfray et al. 2014). The 
use of three neonicotinoids was restricted in 2013, extended 
to all outdoor use in 2018 and is currently being challenged in 
the European courts by agrochemical company Bayer and the 
UK’s National Farmers Union (Case 2020). The use, develop-
ment and regulation of chemical plant protection products has 
had a close relationship with the companies creating them.
The focus of this paper, Regulation 1107/2009 ‘Placing 
Plant Protection Products on the Market’, is a specific piece 
of legislation updating the use and registration of pesticides in 
the European Union. It was introduced in 2009 and came into 
force in 2011 (European Commission 2009a). It derives from 
the EU’s 2006 Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of 
Pesticides (European Commission 2006). This strategy sought 
to reduce risks to human, animal and environmental health 
by encouraging Integrated Pest Management (IPM), banning 
aerial spraying, increasing inspections of equipment and creat-
ing national action plans under Directive 2009/128/EC ‘Sus-
tainable Use of Pesticides’ (European Commission 2009b).
Regulation 1107/2009 bans the use of certain chemicals, 
governs the registration of crop protection products in the 
EU and replaces Council Directive 91/414 with the same 
name. As a Regulation it acts on the individual whereas a 
Directive acts on the nationstate with the nationstate trans-
lating the goals of a Directive into national law (European 
Union 2019). Therefore, a ban on pesticide products under 
Regulation 1107/2009 prohibits individual farmers from 
using them whereas the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Direc-
tive 2009/128/EC encourages nationstates to reduce their 
use. There are a variety of crops potentially affected as well 
as uses not yet explored (e.g. ornamentals).
One of the biggest changes under the new legislation (or 
perhaps one of the biggest concerns of the agricultural com-
munity) is the change in the approval process from ‘risk-
based’ to ‘hazard-based’ determining whether chemical 
pesticides will be withdrawn from use in the EU. The hazard-
based approvals system under Regulation 1107/2009 refers 
to the hazard posed by the active substance, in and of itself. 
Whereas, a risk-based system takes this hazard into account 
and also takes into account how it used (aerial spray, gran-
ules, powder) and how it behaves in the environment (does it 
break down easily, does it wash away into watercourses). In 
practice, this means that the EU does not want to allow sub-
stances that are mutagenic, carcinogenic, toxic for reproduc-
tion, have endocrine disrupting properties, or are persistent 
organic or bioaccumulative pollutants (European Commis-
sion 2009a). See Table 2 in the Annex for a summary of the 
above restricted properties, the substances they map to, crops 
potentially affected and the pathogens that affect those crops.
On the side of banning based on hazard rather than risk 
is Dedieu and Jouzel (2015) who found that the approvals 
system under precursor legislation 91/414 did not, in fact, 
take into account how pesticides are used; although pre-
approval pesticide studies may determine a product to be 
safe if used with appropriate personal protective equipment 
(PPE) when following on-label instructions, Dedieu and 
Jouzel found the pre-approval studies did not use on-farm 
observations of actual use. In the case of sodium arsenite in 
French vineyards, they found farm workers would poten-
tially become contaminated when eating or smoking, a situ-
ation and type of exposure the pre-approval process did not 
consider (Dedieu and Jouzel 2015). The current legislation 
includes a requirement for member states to monitor actual 
usage, however, Dedieu and Jouzel still find the provision 
lacking. They are by no means alone in their criticism of 
chemical pesticides (see for example Kroma and Flora 2003; 
Devine and Furlong 2007; Wilson and Tisdell 2001), of the 
registration system that approves and defends pesticide use 
(e.g. Jas 2007) nor of the assumed safety of PPE in applying 
plant protection products (Garrigou et al. 2020).
Although the legislation states that it will not approve 
substances that have endocrine disrupting properties, this 
particular hazard criterion has proved difficult to implement. 
Endocrine disruption is the altering of an organism’s hor-
monal function with established concerns for both human 
fertility as well as ecosystems demonstrated by Jas and Gau-
dillière’s (2016) analysis of American and French concerns 
about endocrine disruptors. The difficulty in the EU comes in 
deciding whether some or any amount of endocrine disrup-
tion is acceptable. By 2015, defining endocrine disruption had 
not been resolved as it will be decided on a case by case base 
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(European Chemical Agency et al. 2018) when companies 
apply for pesticide products to be approved for use.
Seven of twenty-five at-risk substances have been with-
drawn since the legislation came into force. Pesticides already 
in use in the EU have time-limited approvals and all substances 
that would be banned by this legislation are available for use 
until the end of their approval period. After a substance has 
been approved under Regulation 1107/2009 it has a standard 
approval period of 10 years. For substances that are carcino-
gens, reproductive toxins, or endocrine disruptors where is no 
other viable method of control, a derogation of 5 years may 
be granted (European Commission 2009a). There are other 
elements that make up this legislation (mutual recognition, 
comparative assessment) but they do not all need discussing to 
explore Regulation 1107/2009s effect on innovation.
Although the focus of this paper is on 1107/2009s potential 
to withdraw pesticide products, it is by no means the only pol-
icy intervention influencing innovation. The Sustainable Use 
Directive mentioned above encourages national development 
of Integrated Pest Management plans which may very well 
have spurred innovation in that area (see for example Bruce 
et al. 2017). But this is not that story. Moreover, transition 
to a different type of agriculture requires carrots and sticks.
Methodology
This research started with an intention to conduct immer-
sive ethnography in the research and development office of a 
not-yet-identified agrochemical company. Fieldwork started 
with an exploratory stage of visiting agricultural events and 
organisations documented in ethnographic fieldnotes (see 
Table 3 in the Annex for additional details). Four agricultural 
events were visited, some indoors, some outdoors (i.e. tradi-
tional agricultural shows). Tours were arranged of one large 
agrochemical company, one central government agency, one 
agricultural research institute and one agricultural university. 
During this exploratory phase, concern about 1107/2009 was 
mentioned four times, unsolicited, by an industry organisa-
tion, two agrochemical companies and one research institute 
suggesting its significance to the agricultural sector.
This period of gaining access unsettled the original plan 
of conducting ethnography in an office because agrochemi-
cal companies have research campuses! What’s more, 
1107/2009 itself acts most directly on farmers rather than 
public or private sector organisations. Entering the field 
with an open mind led to the realisation that 1107/2009 
may have an influence on the public sector as well as 
on agricultural sectors outside the agrochemical sector. 
Therefore, the potential research site was broadened from 
a not-yet-approached agrochemical company to concep-
tualise the field-site as the abstract notion of an innova-
tion system. The focus on 1107/209 remained as a way to 
provide a focal point and a way of making a study of the 
system manageable.
Taking inspiration from multi-sited ethnographic approaches 
(Appadurai 1988; Marcus 1995; Falzon 2009; Coleman and 
von Hellermann 2011), 1107/2009 was followed into the UK’s 
system of agricultural innovation through attending more agri-
cultural events (also in Table 3 in the Annex), document analy-
sis and a series of audio-recorded semi-structured interviews. 
Seven more events were attended, all involving science and 
agronomy presentations; three were ‘mainstream’ agricultural 
science events, i.e. on advances in using pesticides, fertilisers, 
machinery and high-performing seeds on monocrop planta-
tions, although the audiences were largely not growers. Two 
subsequent events were growers’ events, one of which was an 
organic growers’ conference. One event was a series of presen-
tations by a government regulatory agency on 1107/2009 itself 
and the last event was a biological control conference.
A series of semi-structured interviews was conducted 
with informants that include: agrochemical companies, pub-
lic sector agricultural research organisations, regulatory bod-
ies, lobby organisations, farmers, agricultural consultants 
and so on. Twenty-nine people were approached and eight-
een interviews were conducted usually starting with a free-
form discussion of the legislation, what it meant for their 
organisation, specific crops that were affected and options 
for pathogen control in a post-1107/2009 world. See Table 4 
in the Annex for additional details on interviewees.
A third phase was implemented to develop a case study 
specifically on potato cultivation for two reasons: 1. The 
change in regulation was threatening mancozeb, one of the 
major fungicidal agents used to protect potatoes against late 
blight (phytophthora infestans), a major pathogen of pota-
toes; 2. The previous phases had included more non-growers 
than growers, the actual focus of the legislation and the users 
(or not) of agricultural innovations. To overcome barriers of 
geography, a survey was implemented, although one that made 
widespread use of free-text boxes in addition to quantifiable 
questions. The main focus of the survey was whether potato 
growers would shift away from chemical fungicides if manco-
zeb was withdrawn to biological and/or practice-based ways 
of controlling late blight. They indicated they would likely not 
change for reasons of market and environmental constraint. 
However, the focus of this paper is on actual changes already 
made (as opposed to theoretical actions not yet taken) which 
was found in the qualitative free-text responses.
Therefore, this paper builds a case study on Regulation 
1107/2009 and uses interviews, ethnographic fieldnotes, offi-
cial documents as well as some qualitative responses to the 
electronic survey sent to British potato growers. Qualitative 
analysis using AtlasTi resulted in two main themes: An unex-
pected inductive theme on the negotiation and disagreements 
of the science-policy process; and a deductive theme looking 
for views on and responses to the change in legislation.
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Us and them and 1107/2009
This section explores how tensions in the legislative pro-
cess influenced the formation of legislation and how this in 
turn influenced the environment in which innovation occurs. 
Even before analysis of fieldwork data that related specifi-
cally to Regulation 1107/2009, there was a general opposi-
tional attitude in the field, an ‘us and them’, with battlelines 
drawn between incompatible types of agriculture. Box 1 
offers an excerpt of a presentation by an ex-agrochemical 
employee where he compared intensive agriculture to sus-
tainable agriculture and said, “neither work”.
Box 1: Presentation excerpt by former 
agrochemical company employee dichotomising 
agricultures
Sustainable agriculture Intensive agriculture
Low input High input
Organic High tech
Small farms Huge farms
[Fieldnote excerpt of presentation, sustainable intensification 
workshop]
This is not to say that there is no agreement that industrial 
agriculture needs to change: “organic does some good 
things for soil” [Fieldnote excerpt, industry workshop]. 
However, that agreement made, there is a reluctance to 
cross sides and change allegiances.
While this dichotomy of mainstream versus sustain-
able agriculture played out generally in the fieldwork, it 
is also reflected more specifically in the discourses and 
debates about Regulation 1107/2009. See Table 1 for a 
selection of pros and cons of the legislation encountered 
during fieldwork. That there is more representation by 
those opposing the legislation is not significant; rather it 
is a result of sample selection; more interviewees repre-
sentative of mainstream agriculture were approached for 
views on Regulation 1107/2009 and because it is a threat 
to mainstream agriculture, most of these interviewees 
were understandably opposed to the legislation. But this 
paper does not wish to speculate or dwell on the pros and 
cons of the legislation, rather it seeks to demonstrate the 
sides of the science battle that are represented: inform-
ants seemed to be for or against the legislation with little 
middle ground to agree on.
Let us unpick some of the oppositional assertions from 
both sides by first having a close reading of the official 
minutes of the 2008 meeting of the All-Party Parliamen-
tary Group (APPG) on Science & Technology in Agricul-
ture convened to discuss the development of Regulation 
1107/2009 (APPG 2008). If we examine the following 
extracts of the minutes from the 2008 meeting, we can see 
how some of the opposition is potentially exaggerated to 
serve as ammunition for and against the legislation. This 
meeting took place before the legislation was finalised in 
2009 and before it came into force in 2011.
First, we see an industry representative warning 
against Regulation 1107/2009 because the cut-off crite-
ria may automatically remove products from use in the 
EU, with an estimated range of 15–85% depending on the 
version of the legislation implemented:
Table 1  Opposition and support 
for Regulation 1107/2009 found 
during fieldwork
Sentiment Informants echoing sentiment




“Regulation may increase pathogen resistance” Agri consultant A, C, and D




“No impact assessment carried out” Industry Organisation
Agrochemical company B
Regulator
Support Reduce health risks/ Protect health Anti-pesticide campaigner A, B, and C
Toxicologist
Reduce environmental risk European Commission document
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Opposed speaker: “[The] switch from the current risk-
based assessments to the use of hazard-based ‘cut-off’ 
criteria…would automatically remove a significant 
number of products currently approved and with a track 
record of safe use. Based on an impact assessment car-
ried out by the UK’s Pesticides Safety Directorate, the 
potential loss of currently approved pesticide products 
would range from 15% under the Commission’s original 
proposals to as much as 85% under First Reading amend-
ments agreed by the European Parliament.” [Minute 2 of 
APPG meeting, industry representative, italics added for 
emphasis (APPG 2008)]
However, once contributions from the floor are included 
(i.e. people not invited to table papers), an anti-pesticide 
campaigner casts doubt on the 85% and 15% withdrawal 
scenario mentioned by the first speaker.
Supportive speaker: “[An anti-pesticide campaigner] 
described the presentations as scaremongering, fail-
ing to mention the safeguards built in to the legislation 
which would allow application of essential use deroga-
tions for five years where no effective alternative was 
available. According to the Commission, just 23 active 
substances would be lost. Some UK food retailers had 
already adopted hazard-based criteria in their own stand-
ards without affecting supply volumes or prices. [Contri-
butions from the floor of APPG meeting, anti-pesticide 
campaigner, italics added for emphasis (APPG 2008)]
The campaigner raises the ‘essential use’ derogation built 
into the legislation, whereby if there is no other way to 
control a pest in a crop, that substance will be allowed 
but reviewed after 5 years, in case a different method 
of control has become commercially viable in that time.
On the other side of the battleline, those that support 
Regulation 1107/2009, there are comments in support 
of it, that are countered by those that do not. For the 
campaigner comments about the legislation supporting 
public and environmental health there are commentators 
on the other side of that battleline likewise casting doubt 
on the environmentalists’ assertions. For the campaigner 
concerned about the effects of pesticides on foetal and 
infant development, there was an industry representative 
not convinced the proposed legislation would actually 
improve public health.
Concerned about endocrine disrupting pesticides: [Cam-
paigner] declared an interest as a longstanding cam-
paigner against pesticide products, particularly those 
associated with endocrine disruption. Her concern was 
that evidence showed effects on the foetus at very low 
levels, yet no pesticide had gone through testing for such 
effects despite the claims of rigorous controls. [APPG 
minute 4, campaigner, italics added for emphasis (APPG 
2008)]
Less concerned about endocrine disrupting pesticides: 
[Industry representative] agreed that concerns over 
potential health effects such as endocrine disruption were 
extremely important. However, the lack of transparency 
behind the Commission’s proposal meant there was no 
certainty or clarity over the definition of what the cut-off 
criteria were, how they would apply, or how they would 
improve public health. [APPG minute 4, industry rep, 
italics added for emphasis (APPG 2008)]
When one pays attention to the fact there are battle-lines 
drawn, that there are vested interests in winning the bat-
tle, we can see that perhaps some of the above opposition 
(and indeed support) is hyperbole, or if not hyperbole, at 
least discourse, those stories that circulate in a commu-
nity and are ‘true’ to that community. Neither is untrue 
in the absolute sense, but rather that truth comes to be 
produced by those communities: “…in trying to make 
sense of the situation under study, researchers often find 
that the people with whom they work have drawn on a 
relatively small number of shared discourses in various 
combinations” (Cook and Crang 1995, p. 12). This is not 
to say that informants actually lie3 but that they believe 
their discourses and belief in a story influences action.
If this research is about the factors that influence inno-
vation, why are the tensions, the he-said-she-said and the 
mud-slinging being discussed at length? It is because 
these disagreements influence the formulation of the 
legislation which then in turn influences innovation and 
technological change. Although this paper is focused on 
the implications of the legislation as it came into force 
in 2011, it did not spring into existence fully-formed. A 
draft of the legislation would have been made available 
for comment and subsequent drafts issued in the period 
before 2009. Both sides of the science battle will have 
made their case and used statements like those above as 
ammunition in the consultation process which may have 
reformulated the final legislation.
In the case of Regulation 1107/2009 this has indeed 
happened and is evidenced not just by the minutes of 
the Science and Technology All-Party meeting. There 
are other negotiation processes as well. In an interview 
with a former industry organisation representative, 
he recounted the steps he took to rally opposition to 
the legislation by the food industry and by the British 
government:
Interviewing referring to Regulation 1107/2009: “The 
regulatory issue was there when I arrived [in post] in 
3 Well, maybe sometimes they do, but this more to be expected if 
researching illegal activities or marginal behaviour.
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2008….So one of the first things I did was to line up 
everyone from the farmers union…to the food and drink 
industry…and I knew many of these organisations prior 
to arriving on the job so I spoke to all the heads of 
the organisations…. I said we have a few pieces of 
legislation emerging in Brussels which is going to be 
very damaging to UK food production and industry at 
a time when prices are rising very rapidly and we need 
to really get that out to the Prime Minister and get that 
out to all the ministers.” [Interview excerpt, ex-industry 
representative]
This was a co-ordinated response by an industry organi-
sation to rally farming representatives, food represent-
atives, agrochemical companies and other industry 
representatives to express their concern about the leg-
islation to the Prime Minister’s office. The UK govern-
ment then expressed this concern to Brussels. Newspa-
per coverage at the time shows evidence of this industry 
response to the legislation, although not all led by the 
same industry organisation mentioned above. For exam-
ple, The Daily Mail, a popular newspaper, reported in 
2008 that the legislation would ban dozens of pesticides 
after the consultancy Agriculture Development Advi-
sory Services (ADAS) assessed the potential influence 
of the legislation (Daily Mail 2008). The ADAS analy-
sis was also reported specifically to different farming 
sectors: Farming UK, a farming newspaper, reported 
ADAS delivering their results to the annual conference 
of the potato levy body as a call for potato growers to 
stay up to date on their pesticide options (Farming UK 
2009).
As to whether there was scope to influence the legisla-
tion in 2008 when it was under consultation, the industry 
interviewee’s response was:
“What we managed to do was blunt it.”
By ‘blunting’ the legislation, making it less restrictive 
than first proposed, this allows certain chemical sub-
stances and therefore pesticide products to continue to be 
used in the EU. Not only are certain products made avail-
able for use, those actors that develop and refine them 
will horizon scan to see what types of products are still 
going to be in use in 5, 10, 15 years time. In this way, the 
regulatory system is a precursor state, encouraging and 
discouraging innovation to occur in certain ways. If that 
precursor state has been moulded into a certain shape 
by lobbying, then the innovation that is encouraged or 
discouraged will fit that new shape (see Fig. 2).
Using Fig. 2 as a metaphor, if the legislation in ques-
tion starts off ‘circular’ but ends up ‘oval-shaped’ due 
to lobbying by campaigners, then the end-points under 
that legislation will be ‘oval’ as well. In the case of the 
‘blunting’ of Regulation 1107/2009, with fewer active 
substances at risk of withdrawal, this allows not only the 
continued use of those substances in the shorter-term, 
but also the development of products containing those 
substances, as well as products with similar chemical 
characteristics; if no endocrine disrupting chemicals 
are allowed in EU crop production, then research and 
development into other substances with any endocrine 
disrupting properties will also be affected. Conversely, if 
some level of endocrine disruption is considered accept-
able, then research into products with this characteristic 
are still worthwhile in the European context. In short, 
research, innovation, diffusion cannot occur in certain 
ways if those ways are banned—or even if they may be 
banned.
Conceptualising campaigning
If we refer back to Fig. 1, lobbyists and campaigners are 
included as one of the influences affecting the system. Inno-
vation systems scholars acknowledge lobbying and cam-
paigning to influence the system under scrutiny although 
many have not explored this in detail: Klerkx et al.’s (2006) 
case study on the attempted adoption of a nutrient man-
agement system sought clear division of actors in this pro-
cess which included lobbying organisations, although did 
not explore further; Markard and Truffer (2008) note that 
Fig. 2  Conceptualising the 
influence of lobbying on legisla-
tion (source author)
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campaigning and lobbying by companies and professional 
organisations are involved in progressing fuel cell technol-
ogy although do elaborate and do not focus on legislative 
issues; Randelli and Rocchi (2017) acknowledge that con-
sumer organisations act as lobbyists influencing policy and 
investment (in cycling, occupational safety) and argue for 
including consumers in an innovation systems approach but 
do not explicitly go into detail on when or how.
This is not to say that social scientists have not studied 
the role of lobbying and campaigning on agri-food policy, 
innovation or governance structures. Lang (1999) described 
“a loose collection of public health professionals, specialists, 
and a new generation of Non Governmental Organizations” 
as an effective lobby in introducing food safety legislation 
in the UK, among other achievements. Campaigners are 
noted to have influenced international governance structures 
such as the General Agreement on Trade and Agriculture 
(GATT), the precursor to the World Trade Organisation 
(Glover 2002) as well as company divestment from agri-
cultural portfolios (Newell 2003). Brasier’s analysis of the 
USA’s 1996 Farm Bill focused specifically on the role of 
campaigners in its formulation (Brasier 2002).
Hermans et al. call this lobbying institutional entrepre-
neurship (2013) where a group of actors separate from 
inventors and innovation brokers seek to change institutions 
and leverage resources to do so: “An institutional entrepre-
neur therefore also works to change the broader context 
so that the innovation has a widespread appeal and impact 
(Hermans et al. 2013, p. 119). Bloomfield and Doolin, in dis-
cussing the development of transgenic cows in New Zealand, 
describe “the intersections between the official governance 
process…and the public debate, protest and legal challenges 
to the research (Bloomfield and Doolin 2011, p. 73, italics 
added for emphasis).” Campaigners for and against trans-
genic cattle helped slow the research programme and made 
consumers wary of transgenic foodstuffs.
Therefore, lobbying, campaigning and dissent or “the bar-
gaining process between those representing government and 
the players” (Torfing 2010) can influence both formal—e.g. 
public consultations—and informal governing. When Walls 
et al. describe the role of NGOs in the governance of risk, it 
is part of a formal governance process: a “[p]rocedural role 
of governance rest[ing] on guaranteeing the participation 
of stakeholders” (Walls et al. 2005, p. 636) where NGOs 
“promote their vision of a better world” (Walls et al. 2005, 
p. 637). However, the influencing of a former prime minis-
ter described by the industry representative is not a formal 
part of the making of Regulation 1107/2009 yet still man-
aged “to blunt it”. Although the Science and Technology 
committee meeting discussed earlier was a formal part of 
the political process, they are not a formal part of the law-
making process yet still exert influence on the law-makers. 
Even though not acting directly on companies or research 
institutes (although sometimes they do through direct action) 
campaigners exert influence on the background environment 
in which they operate, meaning some activities do not oper-
ate at all in the EU.
Innovation responses to Regulation 
1107/2009
After the informal re-shaping of the legislation by the lob-
byists for and against this legislation, what is the sector’s 
view on whether innovation is enabled or constrained? The 
general view of interviewees was that Regulation 1107/2009 
was a barrier to innovation, expressed in this interview 
excerpt:
Industry representative: “Companies are uncertain 
about developing technology where they have to invest 
significant levels of money and they have very long 
pipelines to get it to market. It takes 10 or 15 years 
to get one of these products approved and if you have 
go through 300 separate tests on average for EU by 
law and you have a 10 year period patent but if you 
get to a point where you have invested all that and 
you find there has been a tightening of the legislation 
then that’s a disaster!” [Interview excerpt, ex-industry 
representative]
The above speaker is referring to the chemical discovery 
and patenting process that the agrochemical companies go 
through to bring a new pesticide to market. A change in leg-
islation may make that process longer, more unpredictable 
and even more expensive than it already is. In his view, this 
is a barrier to innovation. However, if we now expand analy-
sis away from the industry’s negative opinion of the legisla-
tion, we see that Regulation 1107/2009 has had a number of 
different responses by different parts of the system. So yes, it 
might be a barrier in some ways but let us look at the variety 
of responses before concluding too easily.
Agrochemical industry responses
The above comment suggests that Regulation 1107/2009 is 
a barrier to innovation for the agrochemical companies in 
terms of chemical discovery. However, they have not been 
complacent in the face of this legislation and have responded 
to the legislation with new pesticide formulations and invest-
ment in alternative methods of control.
The first possible response is for the agrochemical indus-
try to develop products without substances at risk. The two 
agrochemical companies interviewed did this by introducing 
mancozeb-free fungicides, although not as a co-ordinated 
response. Mancozeb is at risk because it has endocrine 
disrupting properties. In the below example, one of the 
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companies stated it had developed a mancozeb-free product 
as a response to the legislation.
Fieldnote excerpt: “In response to question of whether 
Regulation 1107/2009 is driving [their] planning, they 
replied ‘Yes, is driving medium-term planning. For 
R&D guys is longer-term target, most multi-sites are 
threatened.’ They also said, but didn’t write down 
while conducting interview, that they are developing 
mancozeb-free formulations.” [Fieldnote excerpt of an 
interview with agrochemical company]
That company commented that the threat of Regulation 
1107/2009 is driving their longer-term response by driving 
their research into replacements for multi-sited pesticides—
ones that disrupt more than one physiological process—as 
many of this class of product are threatened.
Agrochemical companies have also been engaging in 
strategies that make them less dependent on their chemical 
portfolios in the EU market. One of the major ways is that 
the large agrochemical companies are noted to have invested 
in biocontrol, that is, niche companies that specialise in bio-
logical methods for controlling pests and pathogens. This 
is a serendipitous trend rather than co-ordinated action by 
the agrochemical companies. Although there may be mul-
tiple reasons for them to expand into this niche area, such 
as the 2009/128/EC Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive 
(European Commission 2009b), informants attributed this 
expansion to the threat of Regulation 1107/2009 withdraw-
ing chemicals. Indeed, the topic came up a number of times 
in the field, both solicited and unsolicited by different actors 
in the innovation system. See Box 2 for a selection of men-
tions of agrochemical company expansion into biocontrol.
Box 2: Mentions of agrochemical investment 
in biological control during fieldwork
1. “It’s driving biocontrol, Bayer, Syngenta, BASF have recently 
invested.” [Fieldnote excerpt, ex-agrochemical employee]
2. “And they actually have programmes. Where they [agrochemical 
companies] have integrated pest management biological companies, 
they’re buying all those.” [Interview excerpt, agricultural scientist]
3. “Acquisition of Becker-Underwood mentioned a lot here.” [Field-
note excerpt, biocontrol conference]
4. “We don’t intend on being taken over” [Fieldnote excerpt, 
biocontrol company employee referencing big companies buying 
other biocontrol companies, biocontrol conference]
In the above box on expansion into biological control, 
we see that the agrochemical sector has noted it about 
themselves and about their competitors (Example 1). 
Likewise, agricultural scientists (Example 2) have noticed 
the trend as well. It was also a hot topic at a conference 
of biocontrol specialists (Examples 3–4), particularly the 
acquisition of biocontrol company Becker-Underwood 
by German chemical company Badische Anilin- & Soda 
Fabrik (BASF). If the suite of chemicals is restricted, 
there is little choice but for the agrochemical companies 
to explore other options. They do not expect it to replace 
the chemical options for control, but neither does the bio-
control sector: “It’s not the only solution,” a biocontrol 
expert said [Fieldnote excerpt, biocontrol employee, bio-
control conference].
Plant breeding
The expertise of breeders is also being put to use in the 
response to Regulation 1107/2009. In addition to chemical 
plant protection products, another way of maximising a crop 
is through breeding. Size of tuber, seed pod, stalk, as well as 
shape, flavour, colour and more can be selected by breeders. 
It also possible to breed resistance to pests and pathogens 
into plant cultivars. Regulation 1107/2009 is attributed by 
the following junior agronomist to be helping drive invest-
ment into breeding resistant cultivars:
Junior agronomist: “I think that in terms of managing 
things going forward a lot more effort is going into 
breeding. If you look at the big companies, how they 
are shifting their R&D funds into plant breeding, is a 
sign how things are changing with that.” [Interview 
excerpt, junior agronomist].
In the case of potatoes, companies are requesting and breed-
ers are putting effort into breeding resistance against late 
blight (as well as other targets such as size and shape).
Interviewer: “If late blight is a [breeding] target for 
you, do you think having mancozeb at risk puts pres-
sure on?”
Breeder: “Puts pressure on the companies I work with. 
That’s why they say we want blight resistance. We have 
two ways of tackling that. We use what [genetic stock] 
is available and some of our own [genetic stock]. Some 
colleagues are working with wild species. Some are 
also working with Sainsbury’s Laboratories on a GM 
approach.” [Interview excerpt, potato breeder].
This breeder attributes the threat of legislation as one of 
the reasons that companies and breeders such as himself 
include blight resistance on their list of traits to select for. 
His statement above also suggests that the legislation drives 
the exploitation of wild genetic resources as well as the 
opportunities that lie in transgenic approaches. As with agro-
chemical company acquisition of biocontrol companies, seed 
companies investing in pathogen resistance is convergence 
of company strategy rather than a co-ordinated response.
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Agronomists
Agronomists both help develop innovations by trialling them 
as well as help in their diffusion by recommending new 
products and methods to their clients. Triazole fungicides, 
widely used on cereals, may be withdrawn for the same rea-
son as mancozeb because they may be endocrine disrup-
tors. The threat of the withdrawal of these fungicides was 
discussed with an agronomist interviewee and the options 
for control if they are withdrawn:
Agronomist: “We’d have to look at other ways of con-
trolling and if that meant using other chemical treat-
ments, you would have to go for that. But as things are 
withdrawn you would have to look at the whole picture 
more and use everything in your power to control dis-
ease. So, choosing a top yielding variety may not be 
a priority. A grower’s priority may be what is the best 
variety against [septoria tritici]. Going forward, dif-
ferent varieties are more and more important again.” 
[Interview excerpt, junior agronomist]
For the above agronomist, her response indicates a prefer-
ence for the remaining fungicides if triazoles are withdrawn. 
But if the context in the EU changes she would then consider 
more resistant varieties of wheat over the top-yielding ones. 
Therefore, agronomists are important sources of growing 
strategy and become a conduit for the diffusion of growing 
products and methods.
Scientists
There are a variety of scientists working to provide solutions 
for the agricultural sector: chemists, biologists, geneticists, 
ecologists, toxicologists, and the list goes on. There are 
roughly two types of responses: the shorter-term responding 
directly to the threat of the legislation and longer-term with 
solutions that have yet to break into the vacuum.
In the short term, there are agricultural scientists assess-
ing and exploring the options for managing without specific 
chemicals. For the agricultural scientist below, their recom-
mended strategy is similar to the agronomists above; alter-
native fungicides combined with varietal resistance (even 
though the agronomist above is discussing wheat and the 
scientist below is discussing potatoes).
Interviewer: “Legislation can force changes in innova-
tion…”
Agricultural scientist: “Generally what works best to 
choose as many strategies as you can so as many fun-
gicides and combine them with varietal resistance.” 
[Interview excerpt, agricultural scientist]
In the example above, the interviewee is speaking hypotheti-
cally because fungicide mancozeb has not been withdrawn 
yet. However, the threat of its withdrawal was causing 
actual action as well as hypothetical. A research institute 
has phased out mancozeb in preparation for its potential 
withdrawal to prove that it is possible:
Research institute: “We moved to no mancozeb 
products as we are a research institute and needed to 
show that there were effective alternatives.” [Survey 
respondent, agricultural scientist]
If the definition of endocrine disruption is set such that man-
cozeb is withdrawn under Regulation 1107/2009, there are 
scientists that have been preparing for its withdrawal that 
will be able to provide options for growing as effectively 
as possible.
There were also long-term examples of action such as 
using the withdrawal of chemicals to justify the need for 
cutting edge agricultural technologies. Take for example the 
poster depicted in Fig. 3 on weed mapping and precision 
farming:
In the box, the first bullet point answering the why of 
automated weed mapping reads: “Loss of herbicides due to 
EU Regulations and the Water Framework Directive.”4 The 
authors of this poster are arguing that a restricted pool of 
chemical pesticides necessitates more precise use of those 
that remain. Precision agriculture—the use of GPS and GIS 
(Global Positioning Systems and Geographic Information 
Systems) to precisely apply inputs—is not a new technique 
but has been slow to diffuse (a potato grower interviewee 
has been using these methods for 20+ years). The authors 
of the above poster are using the change in legislation to 
facilitate the movement of these methods into the chemical 
crop protection vacuum created by Regulation 1107/2009.
Does this sort of positioning count as innovation though? 
Making arguments that “My research is important, pesticides 
are being withdrawn across Europe” will be utilised when 
funding allocations for these types of research are discussed 
and negotiated. Having the funding to conduct this research 
is an obvious precursor to then conducting research. Latour, 
the grandfather of the ethnography of science, might agree. 
In Science in Action, his 1987 monograph on following sci-
entists, he spends some time describing engineers inside-
doing-science and managers outside-gaining-resources. This 
division of labour is seen in the case of Tom West trying to 
develop a new computer, the Eclipse MV/8000 (on which 
pictures of the 3D shape of DNA were later taken in 1985):
West is always moving around from headquarters to 
marketing firms and from there to electronic fairs. 
4 The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is another piece of EU leg-
islation that is frequently mentioned as a driver of agricultural change 
in Europe. The WFD seeks to restore European waters to a state simi-
lar to pristine, undisturbed water, phrased in the legislation as “good 
ecological status’” which necessarily precludes the detection of pesti-
cide chemicals in these waters (European Commission 2000).
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While he is away, the microkids [the engineers in the 
lab] are working like devils, completely insulated from 
any economic or political hurdle (Latour 1987, p. 155).
West is outside the laboratories gaining resources by visiting 
marketing firms and electronic fairs so that his engineers can 
work away on technical things and not be encumbered with 
politics. West’s schmoozing enables the engineers to keep 
engineering. As in the case of the Eclipse MV/8000, techno-
logical change in the agricultural sector is also not accidental 
or neutral. There are managers outside gaining resources so 
their own “microkids” can keep “working like devils”. In 
the same way that campaigning on the legislation influences 
precursor conditions, this influences a future precursor state 
in terms of funding allocations. One cannot push forward the 
boundaries of agricultural science nor influence diffusion of 
agricultural technology without the resources to do so. The 
managers, as well as scientists attending industry events, 
will also have brought back to the laboratories messages 
about 1107/2009 and a potentially reducing chemical suite. 
However, it is unlikely messages about 1107/2009 will have 
made scientists substantially change their activities due to 
the long timescales of scientific discovery. It is more likely 
these scientists are making their research more relevant by 
referencing a current social issue.
A cross‑industry consortium
Another response to the threat of the legislation was Sus-
tainable Crop and Environment Protection–Target Research 
for Edibles (SCEPTRE). This was a cross-industry consor-
tium funded by the agricultural levy board, the Agriculture 
and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB). The project 
explored innovation in minor crop protection with the suite 
of chemicals that remain after Regulation 1107/2009 by 
testing 92 chemical pesticides and 67 biopesticides. Of the 
consortium, the agrochemical company interviewed above 
noted:
Agrochemical company: “[We’re] part of it, is a good 
project, joint funding working together. Brings inno-
vation to minor crops area. Legislation drives project. 
Lost actives due to legislation. Loss of herbicides 
major issue for veg growers. Lost seven actives in 
veg.” [Fieldnote excerpt, agrochemical company]
Minor crops often have less investment devoted to their 
protection because the return on investment is lower than 
major crops such as potatoes or cereals. As a result, minor 
crop growers (often vegetables and speciality ornamentals) 
will seek off-label approvals to use products developed for 
the major crops on their minor crops. As a result, the agri-
cultural and horticultural sectors responded by looking for 
alternative uses for the chemicals that remain as well explor-
ing a number of potentially under-utilised biopesticides. The 
SCEPTRE project brought together 24 partners that span 
those included in this paper: big agrochemical companies, 
smaller agricultural consultancies, scientists, levy boards as 
well as nurseries, biocontrol companies and retailers. Bring-
ing these partners together as a co-ordinated response to 
1107/2009 and using existing chemicals in a new way is an 
innovation, just not of the product-innovation type (Fager-
berg 2005; Heertje 1988). The project’s most important 
finding is that new products have been found to fill gaps 
in horticultural crop protection arising from the change in 
legislation (ADAS 2015).
Fig. 3  Photo of science poster 
(unpublished) taken during 
fieldwork on automated weed 
mapping with box highlighting 
loss of herbicides due to EU 
Regulations
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Potato growers
This legislation acts directly on growers, in that it is grow-
ers that would be breaking the law if they used a banned 
pesticide. But is there more to a response than simply not 
using a banned chemical? As suggested in the interview 
excerpts above there are a range of growing options that 
might enter a vacuum created by a withdrawn substance. 
Also, the chemicals that are withdrawn do not disappear 
overnight, they have a registration period that is not renewed 
so any withdrawal has a few years of lead-in.
The survey sent to potato growers about their growing 
practices revealed that some have been reducing their use 
of the chemicals at risk, but most have not changed their 
growing practices. When asked if they had changed their 
growing practices as a result of the legislation, more than 
80% responded ‘No’, they had not because “it ain’t been 
banned yet!” [Survey respondent, potato grower].
However, these growers are not necessarily complacent 
with their heads in the sand. They are consciously doing 
little until required. Firstly, they are thinking through the 
options for growing potatoes without mancozeb by seeking 
appropriate technical advice:
Potato grower: “[N]ot yet but speaking to agronomist 
about alternatives for late blight control.” [Survey 
Respondent, potato grower]
The growing strategies mentioned above of the consultants, 
of the scientists, are put into action when these agronomists 
recommend them to growers looking for options.
Those actors that utilise contract growers, such as proces-
sors, are also biding their time thinking through how they 
would adapt to the legislation. For example, the processor 
below would consider eliminating susceptible potato varie-
ties from their portfolio:
Interviewer: “If mancozeb is withdrawn, how will that 
affect [your] growing strategy?”
Processor: “It will significantly affect what the grow-
ers can use, may make some of the varieties [of pota-
toes] much more risky to grow. Many varieties are not 
particularly blight resistant, eliminate them from the 
[growing] portfolios. I am sure if there is a market for 
potatoes….” [Interview excerpt, potato processor].
Given that there is a market for potatoes if mancozeb is with-
drawn, that UK consumers still want to eat potatoes, the 
above processor will consider alternative varieties to fill the 
vacuum created if mancozeb is withdrawn.
So, potato growers and those that employ them have not 
largely changed their growing practice as a result of the leg-
islation but are seeking advice on how to adapt. Although the 
above grower examples all relate to potato cultivation, it is 
likely that other growers of crops with chemical pesticides at 
risk are doing the same: seeking technical advice from their 
agronomist and thinking through their growing practice.
These may be examples of preparing for and anticipat-
ing change, similar to the reasons Lamine (2011) found in 
French arable farmers’ transition to IPM. In Lamine’s case 
of transitioning to IPM, multiple factors (economics, ecol-
ogy, health and more) converged to push her participants 
to explore IPM approaches, some more robustly than oth-
ers. However, the survey data received does not indicate 
that potato growers (who are usually arable farmers in their 
rotations) experience enough converging factors to sub-
stantially change their growing practice for the following 
reasons: many grow on contract and their clients request 
varieties of potatoes that are not pathogen-resistant; the late 
blight pathogen is fairly virulent and farmers do not want to 
risk crop failure; at the time of writing there was no com-
mercially available biological control alternative although a 
number of investigations are underway (Yao et al. 2016; De 
Vrieze et al. 2018). The only alternative is organic cultiva-
tion, which uses copper sulphate prophylactically and resist-
ant cultivars. As their clients do not contract them to grow 
resistant cultivars, this does not seem to be enough to push 
many UK potato growers to radically change their growing 
practice. However, the focus of this paper is on the potential 
for 1107/2009 to make space for alternative methods of pro-
duction. Having made space, this does not guarantee these 
alternatives will be adopted by farmers.
Winners and losers?
This is not to say that the examples above were the only 
examples or the only types of science hoping to break into 
the vacuum of 1107/2009: there were geneticists hoping 
1 day their field trials would not be torn out of the group by 
anti-GM campaigners; there was a discussion with a doc-
toral researcher working on integrated pest management in 
horticultural greenhouses; there was a regulatory liaison 
officer who had completed a PhD on biocontrol that said 
“I’m pushing for it”, for more field trials testing biological 
control; and there were ecologists giving presentations to 
organic growers about timing the planting of arable crops to 
manage herbivorous beetles.
Which innovations, whether products or practices, are 
adopted does not ultimately depend on which are optimal. 
Social studies of science, particularly those with a histori-
cal view (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979) often demonstrate 
innovations that could have been more than adequate but not 
adopted due to social or political factors were. I.e., if a lone 
inventor creates a brilliant gadget, there are conditions that 
influence whether a company will be interested in developing 
a proof of concept further and whether potential users of that 
gadget actually want to use it. For example, Latour (1987) 
tells the story of the failure of a domestic computer chip 
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industry to develop in Brazil. Or, more relevant to agri-food 
concerns, Harvey (2004) tells the story of the failure of the 
genetically modified tomato in the 1990s, due to a business 
failure on the part of Calgene to establish a consumer mar-
ket for this product. Systems of Innovation scholarship helps 
to explain, conceptualise, and diagram those social factors 
affecting the invention, adoption or diffusion of innovations.
Summary
This paper has reconfirmed the literature that suggests regula-
tion contributes to innovation. However, that literature does 
not give a nuanced account of how debates about regulation 
influence the final formulation of the regulation nor how that 
debate itself is part of the informal shaping of innovation. 
Therefore, this paper also provides an empirical example of 
how lobbying can influence a system of innovation which 
the extant literature theoretically acknowledges but has 
not provided concrete examples. In the case of Regulation 
1107/2009, the informal process of its negotiation resulted in 
a number of iterations of the legislation with the final version 
less restrictive than originally proposed. As a result, fewer 
active substances are likely to be withdrawn which not only 
allows products containing them to continue to be used, it 
also allows development of similar substances. So on the one 
hand, this legislation might be constraining innovation in the 
UK by making the chemical discovery process more difficult 
and expensive, but on the other hand, the role of lobbyists in 
the legislative process reduced this effect, made it “blunt”.
Regulation 1107/2009 has directly influenced the agro-
chemical sector by forcing them to develop mancozeb-free 
fungicides. The legislation has also indirectly influenced 
the agrochemical sector with their acquisition of biocontrol 
companies and expertise. These companies have analysed 
the shape of the future European agricultural landscape and 
seen that it is not only chemical products that will be used 
to produce our food, it also includes biologically derived 
products as well. For them to maintain a presence in the EU 
market, they must do this or become irrelevant.
Regulation 1107/2009 is also putting pressure on plant 
breeders with pathogen resistance being a target to breed for 
as opposed to high yield. Those that provide advice (agrono-
mists and scientists) have been looking at the various options 
for continuing to cultivate and often recommend alternative 
chemicals combined with resistant cultivars. Those scientists 
working to provide long-term solutions have been using the 
legislation as an opportunity to offer their solutions to fill 
the vacuum. The levy body, AHDB, also funded and co-
ordinated a cross-industry consortium that identified new 
uses for existing chemical and biological pesticides.
Regulation 1107/2009 has done all this by threatening 
to withdraw chemical plant protection products. From the 
85% withdrawal scenario mentioned earlier, to date, only 
seven of the twenty-five substances listed in Table 2 in the 
Annex have been withdrawn. Granted, more may be with-
drawn if the definition of endocrine disruption is resolved, 
but nonetheless, this environmental and health and safety 
legislation has helped spur investment in biological con-
trol and influenced the precursor states to the adoption of 
resistant varieties as well as other methods and products. 
So, although the system shaped the legislation to be less 
restrictive, the system still hedged its bets with back-up plans 
by making space for alternative methods and technologies.
Although some growers have been thinking about what 
to do and making some small adjustments to their growing 
practices, in the case of potato growers, they have not yet 
responded to the legislation. However, it is largely not the 
growers that develop innovations, but because they are bound 
up in an innovation system their response (or future response) 
has an effect due to the interconnected nature of the system. 
The potential for diffusion causes yet another precursor state 
that the suppliers of innovations may take into account when 
considering developing a new chemical formulation or breed-
ing a new cultivar. Not only this, when innovations are intro-
duced into the system, through their use, growers may feed 
back into the system to improve the innovations, blurring the 
line between innovation and diffusion.
From an instrumental point of view, if we wish to intervene 
in the system so as to transition to a different type of agricul-
ture, it is prudent to understand what end-users of an innova-
tion want and need and what barriers there are to change. If a 
grower’s hands are tied because other parts of the system lock 
them in to certain ways of growing, understanding their needs 
may allow additional intervention into the system. Although 
Regulation 1107/2009 acts directly on growers and the with-
drawal of chemical compounds potentially creates a vacuum 
into which other methods of control may enter, there may be 
other parts of this system acting more strongly on growers. 
Therefore, further analysis on grower barriers is required.
The UK’s departure from the EU does not undo the 
effects of Regulation 1107/2009 that have already 
occurred. The so-called ‘damage’ is done. Also once 
departed, this may create the need to review Regulation 
1107/2009 and could result in new legislation being pro-
posed which would trigger the to-ing and fro-ing legisla-
tive process all over again.
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Annex
See Tables 2, 3 and 4.
Table 2  Substances at risk: substances most likely to be withdrawn by Regulation 1107/2009, crops affected and pest and pathogens controlled
Source based on Pesticide Safety Directorate (2008) and University of Hertfordshire n.d
a Identified substances that have since been withdrawn
Property Substance (f = fungicide; 
i = insecticide; h = herbicide)
Crops Pests, pathogens and weeds
Mutagen Carbendazim (f) Wheat, oats, barley Septoria, fusarium
Carcinogens Flufenoxurona (i) Apples, brassicas Phytophagous mites
Reproductive toxin Bitertanola (f) Tomatoes, apples, Scab, powder mildew, rusts
Carbendazim (f) Wheat, oats, barley Septoria, fusarium
Dinocapa (f) Grapes, apples, peppers Powdery mildew
Flusilazolea (f) Apples, plums, sugarbeet Scab, powdery mildew
Flumioxazine (h) Peanuts, soybeans Pondweed, algae
Glufosinate (h) Canola, potatoes Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Linuron (h) Carrots, celery, beans Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Endocrine disruptor Bifenthrin (i) Lettuce, cabbage, grapes Sucking foliar pests
Thiacloprid (i) Apples, lettuce, peppers Sucking and chewing pests
Bitertanola (f) Tomatoes, apples Scab, powder mildew, rusts
Carbendazim (f) Wheat, oats, barley Septoria, fusarium
Cyproconazole (f) Cereals, field crops Septoria, rusts
Epoxiconazole (f) Wheat, sugar beet Ascomycetes
Fenbuconazole (f) Cereals, vines, stone fruit Powdery mildew, black rot
Flusilazolea (f) Apples, plums, sugarbeet Scab, powdery mildew
Iprodione (f) Strawberries, lettuce Botrytis, Minilia
Mancozeb (f) Potatoes, melons, lettuce Blights, mildews and scabs
Maneb (f) Potatoes, field crops Blight, leaf spot, rust
Metconazole (f) Canola, barley, oats Alternaria, rusts, fusarium
Tebuconazole (f) Cereals, field crops Smut and bunt diseases
Amitrole (h) Veg, fruit, cereals Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Ioxynila (h) Onions, carrots, cereals Broad-leaved weeds
Linuron (h) Carrots, beans, celery Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Molinatea (h) Rice, other crops Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Tralkoxydim (h) Cereals Grass
Persistent organic pollutant None
Persistent bioaccumulative toxin Bifenthrin (i) Lettuce, cabbage, grapes Sucking foliar pests
Esfenvalerate (i) Barley, fruit, veg Coleoptera, diptera
Lufenuron (i) Grapes, tomatoes Biting and sucking insects
Pendimethalin (h) Carrots, brassicas, grains Grass, broad-leaved weeds
Very persistent and very bioaccumulative Bifenthrin (i) Lettuce, cabbage, grapes Sucking foliar pests
Quinoxyfen (f) Cereals Erysiphe graminis, powdery mildew
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Table 3  Table of fieldwork visits
a As there are only a few each of agrochemical companies, government agencies, agricultural research institutes and agricultural colleges, reveal-
ing their location also reveals their identity
Summary of Phase 1 visits
Events and visits Location
“Financing Agri-innovation” Full day of talks about commercialisation London, UK
“Cereals” Outdoor agricultural tradeshow focused on cereals production Lincolnshire, UK
“Farm Open Day” Outdoor tour and explanation of test-plots and test varieties Cambridgeshire, UK
Visit to large agrochemical company Not  availablea
Visit to central government agency Not  availablea
Visit to publicly funded agricultural research institute Not  availablea
Visit to agricultural college Not  availablea
Summary of Phase 2 events
Event Location
“Sustainable Intensification” Society of Chemical Industry Workshop Southern England
“CropWorld” Agricultural Tradeshow London
“Are Pesticides Dangerous?” CafeScientifique Public Talk Southern England
Organic Growers Conference Midlands
Annual Potato Growers Conference East Anglia
“Efficacy Under 1107/2009 Conference” Yorkshire
Annual IPM and Biocontrol Manufacturer’s Conference Lincolnshire
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